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ABSTRACT 
 
Today’s increasing rate of technological change results from the rapid growth in 
computer processing speed, when combined with the cost decline of processing capacity, 
and is of historical import. The daily life of billions of individuals worldwide has been 
forever changed by technology in just the last few years. Costly data breaches continue at 
an alarming rate. The challenge facing humans as they attempt to govern the process of 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and the impact of billions of sensory devices 
connected to the Internet is the subject of this Article.  
 We proceed in nine sections. First, we define the Internet of Things (IoT), 
comment on the explosive growth in sensory devices connected to the Internet, provide 
examples of IoT devices, and speak to the promise of the IoT. Second, we discuss legal 
requirements for corporate governance as a foundation for considering the challenge of 
governing the IoT. Third, we look at potential IoT threats. Fourth, we discuss the Mirai 
botnet. Fifth, is a look at IoT threat vector vulnerabilities during times of crisis. Sixth, we 
discuss the Manufactured Usage Description (MUD) methodology. Seventh, is a 
discussion of recent regulatory developments. Next, we look at a few recommendations. 
And finally, we conclude. We believe this Article contributes to our understanding of the 
widespread exposure to malware associated with IoT and adds to the nascent but 
emerging literature on governance of enterprise risk, a subject of vital societal 
importance. 
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GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT) 
 
We’re entering an age of acceleration.  The models 
underlying society at every level, which are largely based 
on a linear model of change, are going to have to be 
redefined.  Because of the explosive power of exponential 
growth, the twenty-first century will be equivalent to 20,000 
years of progress at today’s rate of progress; organizations 
have to be able to redefine themselves at a faster and faster 
pace. 
 
Ray Kurzweil      
Director of Engineering at Google1 
 
I. OVERVIEW 
Today’s increasing rate of technological change results from the rapid growth in 
computer processing speed, when combined with the cost decline of processing capacity, 
and is of historical import.2 Giaretta, Dragoni and Massacci report, “Smart homes are 
equipped with a growing number of IoT devices that capture more and more information 
about human beings lives. However, manufacturers paid little or no attention to 
security…”3 As the U.S. National Institutes of Standards and Technology reports in their 
July 2019 exposure draft titled Core Cybersecurity feature Baseline for Securable IoT 
Devices: A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufacturers: 
Manufacturers are creating an incredible variety and volume of Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices, which incorporate at least one transducer (sensor or 
actuator) for interacting directly with the physical world, have at least one 
network interface (e.g., Ethernet, WiFi, Bluetooth, Long-Term Evolution 
[LTE], ZigBee), and are not conventional IT devices for which the 
 
1 Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to 
Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 470 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867, citing 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO THRIVING IN THE 
AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 187 (2016). 
2 Id. 
3 See Alberto Giaretta, Nicola Dragoni & Fabio Massacci, Protecting the Internet of Things with 
Security-by-Contract and Fog Computing, IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, 
413arXiv:1903.04794v2 [cs.CR] (May 2, 2019). 
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identification and implementation of cybersecurity features is already well 
understood (e.g., smartphone, laptop).  Many IoT devices provide 
computing functionality, data storage, and network connectivity for 
equipment that previously lacked these functions. In turn, these functions 
enable new efficiencies and technological capabilities for the equipment, 
such as remote access for monitoring, configuration, and troubleshooting. 
IoT can also add the ability to analyze data about the physical world and 
use the results to better inform decision making, alter the physical 
environment, and anticipate future events.4 
 
The daily life of billions of individuals worldwide has been forever changed by 
technology in just the last few years.5 Costly data breaches continue at an alarming rate.6 
By 2020, “IoT devices are increasingly being implicated in cyber-attacks, raising 
community concern about the risks they pose to critical infrastructure, corporations, and 
 
4 See Michael Fagan, Katerina N. Megas, Karen Scarfone & Matthew Smith, Core Cybersecurity 
feature Baseline for Securable IoT Devices: A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufacturers, Draft 
NISTIR 8259 (July 2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8259-draft.pdf.  
5 Some examples of these recent technological advances having profound impact include: Google 
(founded 1998), see Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-
commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.1 (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067298 [https://perma.cc/23UM-L4Z4] (citing Alphabet Inc., Quarterly 
Report, (Form 10-Q), at 17 (Oct. 27, 2017), PayPal, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 9 (June 
12, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103415/000091205702023923/a2082068zs-
1.htm [https://perma.cc/7G9F-E8FL]; Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic 
Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 274–79 (2016); 
Facebook (2004), bitcoin, blockchain and virtual currencies (2009), Lawrence J. Trautman, Is 
Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 232, 234 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2786186; See Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin 
Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives? 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 
1055 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730983; Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: 
Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICHMOND J. L. & TECH. 
13, 43 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393537; Uber (2009), see Company Info, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/UDE2-9L54] (last visited Jan. 
19, 2018); WhatsApp (2009), Parmy Olson, Exclusive: The Rags-to-Riches Tale of how Jan Koum 
Built WhatsApp Into Facebook’s New $19 Billion Baby, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2014, 7:58 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/02/19/exclusive-inside-story-how-jan-koum-built-
whatsapp-into-facebooks-new-19-billion-baby/ [https://perma.cc/ZRM5-22WM]; Instagram 
(2010), see Gwyn Topham, Look Ma, Mo Hands: What will it Mean when all Cars can Drive 
Themselves?, GUARDIAN (United Kingdom) (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/25/autonomous-vehicles-when-all-cars-drive-
themselves-what-will-it-mean [https://perma.cc/8XRJ-3KNT]. 
6 See BRUCE MIDDLETON, A HISTORY OF CYBER SECURITY ATTACKS: 1980 TO PRESENT (Taylor & 
Francis, 2017); § IV Infra. 
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citizens.”7 In an effort to mitigate “this risk, the IETF is pushing IoT vendors to develop 
formal specifications of the intended purpose of their IoT devices, in the form of a 
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), so that their network behavior in any operating 
environment can be locked down and verified rigorously.”8 The challenge facing humans 
as they attempt to govern the process of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and the 
impact of billions of sensory devices connected to the Internet is the subject of this 
Article.  
 We proceed in nine sections. First, we define the Internet of Things (IoT), 
comment on the explosive growth in sensory devices connected to the Internet, provide 
examples of IoT devices, and speak to the promise of the IoT. Second, we discuss legal 
requirements for corporate governance as a foundation for considering the challenge of 
governing the IoT. Third, we look at potential IoT threats. Fourth, we discuss the Mirai 
botnet. Fifth, is a look at IoT threat vector vulnerabilities during times of crisis. Sixth, we 
discuss the Manufactured Usage Description (MUD) methodology. Seventh, is a 
discussion of recent regulatory developments. Next, we look at a few recommendations.  
And finally, we conclude. We believe this Article contributes to our understanding of the 
widespread exposure to malware associated with IoT and adds to the nascent but 
 
7 See Ayyoob Hamza, Dinesha Ranathunga, Hassan Habibi Gharakheili, Matthew Roughan & 
Vijay Sivaraman, Clear as MUD: Generating, Validating and Applying IoT Behavioral Profiles, 
IoT S&P’18, Aug. 20, 2018, Budapest, Hungary. See also Sarah Coble, Amazon Doorbell Camera 
Lets Hackers Access Household Network, INFOSECURITY MAGAZINE (Nov. 7, 2019); Angella 
Foster, When Parents Spy on Nannies, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2019 at A23; Sandra E. 
Garcia, Maker of Popular Home Security Camera Exposes Users, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2019 at 
B4; Kate Murphy, Is There a Tiny Spy In Your TV Room? How to Unmask It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
16, 2019 atB1; Zack Whittaker, Amazon Ring Doorbells Expose Home Wi-Fi Passwords to 
Hackers, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 7, 2019). 
8 See Hamza, supra note 7. 
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emerging literature on governance of enterprise risk, a subject of vital societal 
importance. 
II. THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT)  
 
“Continued rapid technological progress remains central to economic 
prosperity and social well-being, but it is also introducing potential new 
threats. The Internet of Things (IoT) is connecting billions of new devices 
to the Internet, but it also broadens the attack potential of cyber actors 
against networks and information.” 
Daniel R. Coats 
     Director of National Intelligence 
     May 11, 20179 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) can be defined as “a vast network of devices that are 
connected to the internet and, consequently, each other increasingly.”10 In the simplest of 
terms, any sensory device that may find connectivity to the Internet is a part of the 
Internet of Things. Included are wearables such as: watches or any sensory devices that 
are worn on clothing to detect health vitals such as heart rate, body temperature, blood 
pressure; smart phones; all those household devices such as front door video cameras, 
plant and gardening watering needs, voice command devices to control televisions, room 
temperature, etc. Military sensory applications are robust: IoT remote sensory devices 
monitor troop and vehicle movement; sonar and space sensory applications; vital signs of 
healthy and wounded troops in the battle theatre, just to name a few.  
 
9 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Before the S. Select Comm. 
on Intelligence (115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National 
Intelligence). 
10 NIST, Securing Small Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating 
Network-Based Attacks By Using Manufactured Usage Description, Nat’l Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence (Feb. 2019),  
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Bruce Sinclair writes that, “the Internet of Things (IoT) is just an evolution of the 
Internet. No more, no less. But the business ramifications of IoT are revolutionary and 
will usher in the Outcome Economy.”11 Mr. Sinclair further observes that “The Internet 
of Things killer app is outcomes. It’s outcomes that customers usually want. They don’t 
even care about products: they care about what products do for them…. Customers don’t 
want to own cars, they want to get from one place to another, fast and safe.”12 
Trautman and Ormerod write that “The proliferation of novel consumer devices and 
increased Internet-dependent business and government data systems introduces 
vulnerabilities of unprecedented magnitude.”13 These “Digital vulnerabilities touch upon 
a number of different areas of the law: privacy,14 risk management,15 corporate 
 
11 BRUCE SINCLAIR, IOT INC.: HOW YOUR COMPANY CAN USE THE INTERNET OF THINGS TO WIN 
IN THE OUTCOME ECONOMY xi (McGraw Hill Education, 2017). 
12 Id. at xxii. 
13 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from 
Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 764 (2018), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2982629; citing Trey Herr & Allan A. Friedman, Redefining 
Cybersecurity, American Foreign Policy Council - Defense Technology Program Brief, No. 8, 
(2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2558265; Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the 
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=416740. 
14 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Corey Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 U. 
FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, __ (2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1090423; Neil M. Richards & 
Jonathan H. King, Big Data and the Future for Privacy, In Handbook of Research on Digital 
Transformations (Elgar 2016),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2512069; Sasha Romanosky & 
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal 
Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. __ (2009),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=1522605; Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,  114 COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 583 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2312913; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A 
Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0),  GWU Law School Public Law Research 
Paper No. 132; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 132, https://ssrn.com/abstract=699701; 
Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 257 (2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2017967 
15 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Liam M. D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in 
Cyber-Risk Insurance, 3 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424958; 
Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance, __ LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY __ 
(2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2974233; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, 
D&O Insurance: A Primer, AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998080.   
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governance16 (including the duties of care,17 monitor,18 and disclosure19), breach 
notification,20 information and data security,21 securities regulation,22 law of war,23 
constitutional provisions,24 and more.25 
 
16 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 21/2009; Yale Law, Economics & Public Policy Research Paper No. 388; Harvard Law 
and Economics Research Paper Series No. 644 ; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 135/2009, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What 
Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=593423; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s 
Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
313 (2011), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1947283. 
17 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin 
Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 07-09,  https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006097; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of 
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=899212. 
18 Id., citing Robert T. Miller, The Board's Duty to Monitor Risk after Citigroup, 12 U.  PA. J. BUS. 
L. 1153 (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1696166. 
19 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of 
Outside Directors, __ ASIA BUS. L. REV. 3 (2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=270749; Henry T. C. 
Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, 'Pure Information,' and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 
90 TEX. L. REV. __ (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083708; Peter A. Swire, Theory of 
Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and 
Government Agencies, 42 HOU. L. REV. 101 (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=842228. 
20 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Fabio Bisogni, Evaluating Data Breach 
Notification Laws - What Do the Numbers Tell Us?, TPRC 41: The 41st Research Conference on 
Communication, Information and Internet Policy, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2236144; 
Dana Lesemann, Once More Unto the Breach: An Analysis of Legal, Technological and Policy 
Issues Involving Data Breach Notification Statutes, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 203 (2010), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1671082; Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data 
Security Breaches. 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=908709; Jane K. 
Winn, Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 BERK. TECH. L. J. __ (2009), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1416222. 
21 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Ian Brown, Lilian Edwards & Christopher Marsden, 
Information Security and Cybercrime, In  LAW AND THE INTERNET, (3rd Ed., L. Edwards, C. 
Waelde, eds., Oxford: Hart, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1427776; Paul Ohm, Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization , 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1701 (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450006; Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data 
Security and Personal Information, In SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE, (Radin 
& Chander, eds., Stanford University Press, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=583483; Richard 
Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Defending Our Data: The Need for Information We Do Not Have, 
(2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816010; Josephine Wolff, Models for Cybersecurity Incident 
Information Sharing and Reporting Policies, TPRC 43: The 43rd Research Conference on 
Communication, Information and Internet Policy Paper (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587398. 
22 Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13, citing Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The 
Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=600709; Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129 (2005), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=903263; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as 
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Explosive Growth in Sensory Devices 
 The use of “IoT products at home and work… [anticipates] the number of 
connected devices to reach 20.4 billion by 2020.”26 The National Institutes of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) observes: 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly evolving and expanding 
collection of diverse technologies that interact with the physical world. 
IoT devices are an outcome of combining the worlds of information 
technology (IT) and operational technology (OT). Many IoT devices are 
the result of the convergence of cloud computing, mobile computing, 
embedded systems, big data, low-price hardware, and other technological 
advances. IoT devices can provide computing functionality, data storage, 
and network connectivity for equipment that previously lacked them, 
enabling new efficiencies and technological capabilities for the equipment, 
such as remote access for monitoring, configuration, and troubleshooting. 
IoT can also add the abilities to analyze data about the physical world and 
 
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, VANDERBILT L. REV. (2003), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=362860; Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The 
Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148. 
23 See Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau & Herbert S. Lin, Limiting the Undesired Impact of 
Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809463; Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and 
Insights, __ GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. (Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932110; Eric 
Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the 
Right to Self-Defense, 38 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 207 (2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=987046; 
Dakota S. Rudesill, James Caverlee & Daniel Sui, The Deep Web and the Darknet: A Look Inside 
the Internet's Massive Black Box, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, STIP 03, 
October 2015; Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 314, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676615; 
Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris 
and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. __ (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481629; 
Scott Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on 
Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors, __CHI. J. INT’L L. 
(2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2652446; Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar?: 
International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective Measures, In Cyberwar: Law and Ethics for 
Virtual Conflicts (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern, Claire Finkelstein, eds., 2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596634. 
24 Id., citing Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005714. 
25 See Trey Herr, Bruce Schneier & Christopher Morris, Taking Stock: Estimating Vulnerability 
Rediscovery, Belfer Cyber Security Project White Paper Series (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928758. 
26 See NIST, Securing Small Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating 
Network-Based Attacks By Using Manufactured Usage Description, Nat’l Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence (Feb. 2019).  
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use the results to better inform decision making, alter the physical 
environment, and anticipate future events. While the full scope of IoT is 
not precisely defined, it is clearly vast. Every sector has its own types of 
IoT devices, such as specialized hospital equipment in the healthcare 
sector and smart road technologies in the transportation sector, and there is 
a large number of enterprise IoT devices that every sector can use. 
Versions of nearly every consumer electronics device, many of which are 
also present in organizations’ facilities, have become connected IoT 
devices—kitchen appliances, thermostats, home security cameras, door 
locks, light bulbs, and TVs.27 
 
During 2019, Giaretta, Dragoni and Massacci provide the following summary of 
the IoT environment: 
According to Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, Internet of 
Things (IoT) surpassed the so-called peak of disillusion, headed to an 
established role within society. But all the problems are far from being 
solved and, the more pervasive the IoT becomes, the harder it is to manage. 
In particular, IoT security is one of the biggest cybersecurity challenges, 
and one of its most embarrassing failures. Traditional cybersecurity 
solutions have proven to be ineffective for IoT due to a number of technical 
and operational challenges. First, IoT devices are highly heterogeneous, 
with huge differences across tiers, languages, OSes, and networks. Also, the 
IoT lacks a common security framework, and standards are still not settled. 
Often times, security is not a manufacturers’ (nor IT adminis’) core 
competency, and may not be even considered part of the IoT product 
development process.28 
 
A recent Google search identified consumer products such as a front door IoT 
camera monitor having a sales price point of US$34.95; and a baby monitor offering “Pet 
Camera Wireless IP Security WiFi Surveillance Camera with Cloud Storage Two Way 
Audio Pan/Tilt/Zoom Night Vision Motion Detect Remote Control for Home/Shop/ 
 
27 Katie Boeckl, Michael Fagan, William Fisher, Naomi Lefkovitz, Katerina N. Megas, Ellen 
Nadeau, Danna Gabel O’Rourke, Ben Piccarreta & Karen Scarfone, Considerations for Managing 
Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks, NISTR 8228 iv (June 2019), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8228.pdf.  
28 See Giaretta, et al., supra note 3. 
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Office,” priced at US$39.95.29  Exhibit 1 provides an example of just one of the many 
IoT devices that connect to the Internet. Dozens of IoT sensors may be found in a typical 
smart home, “whereas industrial applications can scale up to hundreds of IoT devices. 
This introduces a number of problems, such as maintaining and monitoring the IoT 
devices, allowing and disallowing communication protocols, and overseeing what kind of 
information can be shared under defined conditions.”30 
Exhibit 1 
Example of Internet Connectivity Device31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Promise of The Internet of Things 
Kris Alexander, CTO of Akamai Technologies notes the promise of the Internet 
of Things or the Internet of Everything: 
The promise of the IoT/IoE is that devices can now connect together (and 
with people) to enable new actions – to do something they couldn’t before; 
like to warn you when your resting heart rate is too high, or learn how cool 
 
29 Recent Google search for ‘IoT camera.‘ 
30 See Giaretta, et al., supra note 3. 
31 Recent Google search for ‘IoT camera.‘ 
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you like your house and when you get home, and adjust the temperature 
before you get there.32 
 
 According to Bruce Sinclair, system integration engineers “look at IoT 
technology as a networking stack, which is, in a sense simply a protocol map.”33 (See 
Exhibit 2). Mr. Sinclair then hastens to add, “Mapping protocols from where the sensor 
data comes in, to the application is the absolute wrong way to look at the tech ̶ at least for 
business. This is plumbing and not where the value originates.”34 
Exhibit 2 
Network Engineer’s View of IoT35 
 
 
 
 
32 Kris Alexander, CTO, Akamai Technologies; https://juniper-
networks.cioreview.com/cxoinsight/the-promise-and-challenges-of-an-internet-of-things-iot-
world-nid-4769-cid-73.html 
33 See Sinclair, supra note 11 at 5. 
34 Id. 
35 See Sinclair, supra note 11 at 5. 
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Writing from a business value perspective, Bruce Sinclair observes, “but 
plumbing is a means to an end; it is the way to get data from one place to another.”36 
While Sinclair writes, “I don’t look at IoT tech as a networking stack because it doesn’t 
properly isolate and highlight where value is created;37 mention of the networking stack 
lends value to our discussion here. 
III. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE 
“[T]he frequency and impact of cyber-attacks on our 
nation’s private sector and government networks have 
increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected 
to continue to grow. We continue to see an increase in the 
scale and scope of reporting on malicious cyber activity 
that can be measured by the amount of corporate data 
stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information 
compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. 
victims. Within the FBI, we are focused on the most 
dangerous malicious cyber activity: high-level intrusions 
by state-sponsored hackers and global organized crime 
syndicates, as well as other technically sophisticated 
attacks.” 
   Christopher Wray 
   Director 
   Federal Bureau of Investigation 
   September 27, 201738 
 
 
In the very briefest of terms, corporate officers and directors have two primary 
duties to shareholders: a duty of loyalty (no self dealing); and a duty of care (a duty to 
behave reasonably. The duty of care applies across director’s and officers’ myriad 
responsibilities, including handling the corporation’s digital data. The duty of care is 
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging 
Threat to Corporations, 86(2) TENN. L. REV. 503, 507 (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3238293, 
citing Current Threats to the Homeland: Hearings Before the S. Homeland Security and Govt. 
Affairs Comm, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation). 
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substantially procedural. During recent years, increased focus has been brought to bear on 
the responsibility of directors to ensure the data privacy of customers and users.39 NIST 
observes: 
Many organizations are not necessarily aware they are using a large 
number of IoT devices. It is important that organizations understand their 
use of IoT because many IoT devices affect cybersecurity and privacy 
risks differently than conventional IT devices do. Once organizations are 
aware of their existing IoT usage and possible future usage, they need to 
understand how the characteristics of IoT affect managing cybersecurity 
and privacy risks, especially in terms of risk response—accepting, 
avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk.40 
 
We now present a very brief discussion of the corporate duties of loyalty and care. 
Duty of Loyalty 
Under Delaware law, the duty of loyalty requires “that there shall be no conflict 
between duty and self-interest.”41  The core concept of the fiduciary “duty of loyalty” has 
been described as: 
[t]he requirement that a director favor the corporation’s interests over her 
own whenever those interests conflict.  As with the duty of care, there is a 
duty of candor aspect to the duty of loyalty.  Thus, whenever a director 
confronts a situation that involves a conflict between her personal interests 
and those of the corporation, courts will carefully scrutinize not only 
whether she has unfairly favored her personal interest in that transaction, 
but also whether she has been completely candid with the corporation and 
its shareholders.42 
 
 Conflicts of interest “do not per se result in a breach of the duty of loyalty.  
Rather, it is the manner in which an interested director handles a conflict and the 
 
39 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Governance of the Facebook Privacy Crisis,  20 PITT. J. TECH. L. & 
POL’L (2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3363002.  
40 See Boeckl, et. al., supra note 27 at iv. 
41  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for 
Information Technology Governance, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 313, 324, (2011), 
citing Guth v. Loft, A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
42 Id. citing Charles R.T. O’Kelley and Robert B. Thompson, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (Aspen, 5th ed. 2006). 
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processes invoked to ensure fairness to the corporation and its stockholders that will 
determine the propriety of the director’s conduct…”43  Generally, except in cases where a 
director has an undisclosed financial interest in the outcome of a major corporate  
purchase or contract decision, the duty of loyalty does not seem to require additional 
focus. 
Duty of Care 
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price have previously written that, “The duty of care 
for directors ‘arises in both the discrete decision-making context and in the oversight and 
monitoring areas.’44  Prior the landmark 1985 case Smith v. Van Gorkom,45 absent 
accompanying disloyal acts, it was generally accepted that “courts had rarely found 
 
43  Id. citing Byron Egan, Director Duties: Process and Proof, TexasBarCLE Webcast: Corporate 
Minutes/ Director Duties (Oct. 23, 2008) (www.jw.com/site/jsp/publicationinfo.jsp?id=1044).  
44 See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 41 at 322, citing Lyman P.Q. Johnson and Mark 
A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2004) (citing Citron v. Fairchild 
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989)); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 
(Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decision making context is process due care only.”). 
45  See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 41 at 322, citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858 (Del.Supr. 1985).  The Delaware Supreme Court found that the experienced and 
sophisticated directors of Trans Union Corporation were not entitled to the protection of the 
business judgment rule and had breached their fiduciary duty to their shareholders “(1) by their 
failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant to their 
decision to recommend the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material 
information such as a  reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to 
approve the Pritzker offer.”  Id. at 888; see also See Peter V. Letsou, Cases and Materials on 
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions n21 at 643 (2006) (observing “Trans Union’s five ‘inside’ 
directors had backgrounds in law and accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the 
company and 68 years of combined experience on its Board.  Trans Union’s five ‘outside’ 
directors included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist who was a former 
dean of a major school of business and chancellor of a university.  The ‘outside’ directors had 78 
years of combined experience as chief executive officers of major corporations and 50 years of 
cumulative experience of Trans Union.  Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently 
qualified to reach an informed judgment on the proposed ‘sale’ of Trans Union notwithstanding 
their lack of any advance notice on the proposal, the shortness of their deliberation, and their 
determination not to consult with their investment banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.”). 
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individual directors liable for breaching their duty of care.”46  Experienced and 
sophisticated directors in that case were not entitled to the protection of the business 
judgment rule in some cases because: 
the duty of care specifies the manner in which directors must discharge 
their legal responsibilities… includ[ing] electing, evaluating, and 
compensating corporate officers; reviewing and approving corporate 
strategy, budgets, and capital expenditures; monitoring internal financial 
information systems and financial reporting obligations, and complying 
with legal requirements; making distributions to shareholders; approving 
transactions not in the ordinary course of business; appointing members to 
committees and discharging committee assignments, including the 
important audit, compensation and nominating committees; and initiating 
changes to the certificate of incorporation and bylaws.47   
Duty to Provide Data Security 
 The broad Duty of Care includes a duty to provide data security. Professors 
Trautman and Ormerod write: 
The duty of care applies across directors’ and officers myriad 
responsibilities, including handling the corporation’s digital data. There is, 
therefore, an emerging specific application of the duty of care as related to 
information technology: the duty to secure data. The applicable standard 
of care requires directors “to provide ‘reasonable’ or ‘appropriate’ 
 
46 See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 41 at 322, citing Jacqueline M. Veneziani, Note 
& Comment: Causation and Injury in Corporate Control Transactions: Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1194 n.3 (1994) (“Before Van Gorkom was decided, 
one commentator had stated that ‘[t]he search for cases in which directors… have been held liable 
in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small 
number of needles in a very large haystack.’  Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy 
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 
1078, 1099 (1968).  But see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., supra note _ at 945-46 (disputing Prof. 
Bishop’s statement and noting that there are actually many cases upholding duty of care 
violations).” 
47  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors' and Officers' 
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (2017), 
[Hereinafter “Yahoo Data Breach”]http://ssrn.com/abstract=2883607, citing Lyman P.Q. Johnson 
and Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2004) citing Citron v. Fairchild 
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 
(Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decision-making context is process due care only.”). 
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physical, technical, and administrative security measures to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of corporate data.”48 
There is not, however, a single source—such as a comprehensive 
federal statute or regulation—that imposes a duty to provide data security.  
Rather, corporate legal obligations to implement data security systems are 
“set forth in an ever-expanding patchwork” of state, federal, and 
international statutes; regulations; enforcement actions; and common law 
duties, including “contractual commitments, and other expressed and 
implied obligations to provide ‘reasonable’ or ‘appropriate’ security for 
corporate data.”49 
Leadership at the Top  
Any effective enterprise program to defend against cyberattack requires a 
commitment from top management to clearly communicate that good cyber hygiene is 
important and a top priority, not just empty rhetoric. Adequate resources must be 
provided in every organization if realistic progress against cyberthreat is to be made. 
Cyber attack and data theft is a real threat for all organizations: entrepreneurial start-
ups;50 non-profits;51 municipalities;52 educational institutions;53 as well as large corporate 
entities.54 
 
48 THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, INFORMATION SECURITY LAW: THE EMERGING STANDARD FOR 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 29 (2008).  
49 Id. at 29.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. 
ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y  341 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548561; Lawrence J. Trautman, 
Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 
147 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638448. 
50 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony “Tony” Luppino & Malika S. Simmons, Some Key Things 
U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to Know About The Law and Lawyers, 46 TEXAS J. BUS. L. 155 (2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606808. 
51 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics, 52 AKRON L. REV. 
971 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133818. 
52 Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 341 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548561. 
53 David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and Employer Liability 18(1) COLO. 
TECH. L.J. (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251479.  
54 See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 275 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623219.  
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Board Talent and Experience  
Corporate board nominating committees are challenged with the task of locating 
and recruiting directors who have the skills and experience necessary to govern data and 
information systems risk.55 Very few directors have a background in computer science or 
electrical engineering. As a result, many boards are frustrated by the task of governing 
something they know very little about.56 
Audit or Risk Committee Domain  
Corporate boards operate through committees. Ensuring that the enterprise has a 
robust defense against cyberattack is handled by the board’s audit committee in many 
organizations.57 Other boards have created a risk committee with data security being an 
increasing focus for many organizations. 
IV. POTENTIAL IoT THREATS 
Author Trautman has now spoken about IoT vulnerabilities on numerous 
occasions and has found his audiences particularly receptive to the following description 
of how data security threats are contained in IoT use. He asks his audience to “please 
close your eyes and imagine you are walking on a dark beach at night. As you walk you 
detect minor pricks to your feet (it feels like maybe a mosquito bite, but it isn’t). After a 
 
55 See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and 
Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998489.  
56 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC 
Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 205 (2013), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2137747.   
57 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC 
Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 205 (2013), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2137747.   
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while you realize that your legs have become numb.”58 Unknown to you, “the beach is 
covered with billions of hypodermic needles, all containing a localized anesthetic 
numbing agent like Novocaine (some contaminated with virus ̶ think Ebola or HIV). This 
approximates the risk each of us is experiencing with IoT. You may open your eyes 
now.”59 Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats in his prepared remarks before 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for the 2017 hearings on the Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community observes that 
The widespread incorporation of “smart” devices into everyday objects is 
changing how people and machines interact with each other and the world 
around them, often improving efficiency, convenience, and quality of life. 
Their deployment has also introduced vulnerabilities into both the 
infrastructure that they support and on which they rely, as well as the 
processes they guide. Cyber actors have already used IoT devices for 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and we assess they will 
continue. In the future, state and non-state actors will likely use IoT 
devices to support intelligence operations or domestic security or to access 
or attack targeted computer networks.60 
 
Another way to think about IoT security vulnerabilities is to consider how you 
take the time to see that your home or apartment, containing your valuable possessions, is 
securely locked when you leave it unattended. Here, just as with your valuable personal 
data assets, the use of poorly secured IoT devices is roughly equivalent to locking the 
front door of your home and leaving the back door wide open. Consider the extent to 
which your home and family are vulnerable to unsecure IoT devices. Professors Streiff, 
Das and Cannon write, “The sensor capabilities of IoT toys along with other critical data, 
 
58 Lawrence J. Trautman, Remarks presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Governance of 
Emerging Technologies, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, May 22 
& 23, 2019 (on file with authors). 
59 Id. 
60 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Before the S. Select Comm. 
on Intelligence (115th Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National 
Intelligence). 
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including location information, possess significant risk for malicious activity. Even 
unsophisticated attacks leading to location leakage can be problematic for vulnerable 
populations such as children. For parents, these are risks for which they are generally 
unprepared.”61 Courtesy of Bruce Sinclair, a graphic illustration of IoT threat vectors is 
presented as Exhibit 3. 
Exhibit 3 
Attack Vectors in IoT62 
 
 
 
 
61 See Joshua Streiff, Sanchari Das & Joshua Cannon, Overpowered and Underprotected Toys 
Empowering Parents With Tools to Protect Their Children, IEEE Humans and Cybersecurity 
Workshop (HACS 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3509530.  
62 See Sinclair, supra note 11 at 244. 
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Data Breaches Continue 
 By now, every reader should be aware of the continued threat posed by 
inadequate data security.63 A comprehensive discussion about the history, nature, and 
current threat profile of data breaches is beyond the scope of this single Article. However, 
we have chosen to mention and describe briefly the following data breaches: Target 
(December 2013); Yahoo (2013, but not reported until several years later); Equifax 
(2017); Office of Personnel Management (June 2015); Marriott Hotels (January 2019); 
and Capital One Financial Corp. (July 2019). These representative and widespread 
breaches have been chosen, in part, because one of your authors believes he was a victim 
of each. In addition, we are including a brief discussion about what is now known 
regarding the breach of at least 106 million card applicants of Capital One Financial 
Corp., first reported during July 2019. For historical reference, Exhibit 4 presents 
“Reported Incidents of Loss, Theft or Exposure of Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII)” for the period covering 2014 thru year-end 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 See Julia Carpenter & Bouree Lam, Consumers Feel Breach Fatigue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2019 
at B4. 
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Exhibit 4 [UPDATE] 
Reported Incidents of Loss, Theft or Exposure of 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)64  
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5 presents a list of the top 11 all-time Breaches as of July, 2019. 
 
Exhibit 5 
Top 11 All-time Breaches as of July, 201965 
 
1. YAHOO.  Reported breach of 3 billion records on December 14, 2016. 
2. DU CALLER GROUP (China).   2 billion records: customer names, 
addresses inappropriately made accessible in public directory, on May 13, 
2017.  
3. RIVER CITY MEDIA (US).  1.3 billion records: names; addresses; IP 
addresses; email addresses; undisclosed number of financial documents; 
chat logs and backup; exposed by faulty rsync backup, March 3, 2017. 
4. NETEASE, INC, dba 163.com (China).  Reports 1.2 billion records 
stolen by hackers (emails, addresses, and passwords) and offered for sale 
on the dark web, January 25, 2017 . 
 
64 Footnote to follow when table is updated in February, 2020. 
65 See Cyber Risk Analytics, 2019 MidYear QuickView Data Breach Report, RiskBased Security 
12 (Aug. 2019), 
https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2019/2019%20MidYear%20Data%20Breach%
20QuickView%20Report.pdf. 
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5. UNKNOWN (India).  Village-level enterprise operators sell access to the 
Aadhaar database, Jan.3, 2018. 1,190 million names, addresses, email 
addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, fax numbers, genders, IP 
addresses, and photographs of Indian citizens… January 3, 2018. 
6. VERIFICATIONS.IO (Estonia). 982 million names addresses, email 
addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, fax numbers, genders, IP 
addresses, personal mortgage amounts, and FTP server credentials, 
exposed on the Internet due to a misconfigured database. March 7, 2019. 
7. FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION (U.S.) 
Approximately 885 million real estate closing transaction records 
containing names, Social Security numbers, phone numbers, email and 
physical addresses, driver’s license images, banking details, and mortgage 
lender names and loan numbers exposed on the Internet due to IDOR 
flow. 
8.  UNKNOWN (Netherlands).  Breach of 711 million records: email 
addresses; passwords; credentials exposed on the Internet due to 
misconfigured database, January 3, 2017. 
9. CULTURA COLECTIVA (Mexico). 540 Million Facebook user IDs, 
account names, comments, and likes exposed on the Internet due to a 
misconfigured database. 
10. YAHOO (US). Breach involving 500 million records: user names; email 
addresses; phone numbers; dates of birth; hashed passwords and security 
questions and associated answers, September 22, 2016.66 
  
 
Author Trautman believes it is likely that his household has been negatively impacted 
by each of the following data breaches: Target (2013); Yahoo (2013); Equifax (2017); 
Office of Personnel Management (June 2015); Marriott (January 2019); and Capital One 
Financial Corp. (July 2019). 
Target (2013)  
U.S. retailer Target reported that the “information stolen between November 27 
and December 15, 2013 included personal information of as many as 70 million people--- 
 
66 Id. 
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more than the 40 million the company originally estimated.”67 Several years later, Target 
agreed to “pay $18.5 million to 47 states and the District of Columbia as part of a 
settlement with state attorneys general.”68 In total, Target reports that the estimated cost 
of the breach approximates $300 million.69 
Yahoo (2013)  
As shown in Exhibit 2, Top 11 All-time Breaches as of December 31, 2018, 
Yahoo! Inc. has the distinction of: (1) being responsible for several of the largest U.S. 
data breaches; and (2) being among the slowest to inform consumers of these breaches.70 
As reported by professors Trautman and Ormerod, On September 22, 2016 Yahoo! Inc. 
announced that a data breach and theft of information from over 500 million user 
accounts had taken place during 2014. It now appears that this theft included names, 
birthdays, telephone numbers, email addresses, “hashed passwords (the vast majority 
with bcrypt) and, in some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and 
answers.”71 This 2014 theft represents the largest data breach ever at the time it was 
announced.72 Yahoo further disclosed their belief that the stolen data “did not include 
 
67 See Maggie McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info On As Many As 70 Million Customers, 
FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-
breach-spilled-info-on-as-many-as-70-million-customers/#6343ee5ae795.  
68 See Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-security-breach-
settlement.html.  
69 See Vincent Lynch, Cost of 2013 Target Data Breach Nears $300 Million, HashedOut, May 26, 
2017. 
70 See Yahoo Data Breach. supra note 47 at 1233. 
71 Id. citing Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., An Important Message to Yahoo Users on Security (Sept. 
22, 2016), https://investor.yahoo.net/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=990570.  
72  See Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N. Y. 
TIMES, Seot 22, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-
hackers.html?_r=0. 
EARLY DRAFT-COMMENTS WELCOME-1/27/2020 9:12 PM 
 
©   2019-20 Lawrence J. Trautman, Page 26 All rights reserved 
Mohammed T. Hussein, Louis Ngamassi 
& Mason J. Molesky 
unprotected passwords, payment card data, or bank account information.”73 Just two 
months before Yahoo disclosed its 2014 data breach, a proposed sale of the company’s 
core business to Verizon Communications was announced.74  Yahoo then announced,  
during mid-December 2016, “that another 1 billion customer accounts had been 
compromised during 2013, establishing a new record for the largest data breach ever.”75 
Equifax (2017)  
On September 7, 2017, global credit reporting agency Equifax “announced that its 
consumer information had been compromised as a result of a ‘cybersecurity incident.”76 
McKay Smith and Garrett Mulrain report that “this incident resulted in the loss of the 
personally identifiable information (PII) of 143 million American consumers, or nearly 
45 percent of the American population.”77 How does something like this happen? It 
appears, “The Department of Homeland Security alerted Equifax officials on March 8, 
2017 that they needed to fix a critical security vulnerability in their software. Company 
officials disseminated the alert internally but failed to manually patch the application. 
This single point of failure would prove to be catastrophic.”78 
 
73 Id. 
74 See Yahoo Data Breach. supra note 47.  
75  Id. at 1234, citing Robert McMillan, Ryan Knutson & Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo Discloses 
New Breach of 1 Billion User Accounts, WALL ST. J., Dec 15, 2016, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-discloses-new-breach-of-1-billion-user-accounts-
1481753131.  
76 See McKay Smith & Garrett Mulrain, Equi-Failure: The National Security Implications of the 
Equifax Hack and a Critical Proposal for Reform, 9 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 549 (2018); See 
also Scott J. Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time For A National Cybersecurity Safety 
Board? Examining The Policy Implications and Political Pushback (unpub ms) (2019). 
77 Id. citing Spencer Kimball & Liz Moyer, Equifax Data Breach May Affect 2.5 Million More 
Consumers than Originally Stated, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/equifax-2-point-5-million-more-consumers-may-be-affected-
by-data-breach-than-originally-stated.html.  
78 See Smith & Mulrain, supra note 76 at 555.  
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Office of Personnel Management (June 2015)  
The June 2015 breach containing some of America’s most sensitive information 
at the U.S. Office of Personnel constitutes a particular threat to American national 
security because the data stolen “was significant in that it specifically targeted security 
clearance information for the federal workforce… The catastrophic harm may… occur at 
some point in the future, to include ‘the ability to blackmail, shame, or otherwise coerce 
public officials.’”79 
Marriott (January 2019)  
As disclosed on November 30, 2018 and in Exhibit 3, hackers were able to 
compromise the hotel chain’s loyalty program database, exposing 383 million records: 
names; addresses; reservation details; and passport numbers.80 According to The 
Washington Post, “hackers have had access to the reservation systems of many of its 
hotel chains for the past four years, a breach that exposed private details of up to 500 
million customers while underscoring the private nature of records showing where and 
when people travel ̶ and with whom.”81 
Capital One Financial Corp. (July 2019)  
The fifth largest credit card issuer in the United States, Capital One Financial 
Corp., reported the breach of at least 106 million records of card customers and 
 
79 Id. at 563. 
80 See Taylor Telford & Craig Timberg, Marriott Discloses Massive Data Breach Affecting Up to 
500 Million Guests, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/30/marriott-discloses-massive-data-breach-
impacting-million-guests/?noredirect=on.  
81 Id. 
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applicants during late July 2019.82 As an indication of the cost to corporations of these 
data breaches, common stock share values for Capital One Financial Corp. closed down 
5.9% of the day of announcement, July 30, 2019.83 The Wall Street Journal reports, the 
arrest of “Paige A. Thompson, a former employee at Amazon.com Inc’s cloud-computing 
unit.”84 The Wall Street Journal story continues to report that “the largest-ever bank-data 
heists appeared to have exploited a vulnerability in the cloud that security experts have 
warned about for years.”85 
Ransomware 
Are the billions of IoT sensors the gateway vehicle for ransomware attacks? 
During 2018, professors Trautman and Ormerod provided an extensive account of the 
history and evolution of ransomware,86 and we will not duplicate that effort here. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines ransomware as: 
a type of malware installed on a computer or server that encrypts the files, 
making them inaccessible until a specified ransom is paid. Ransomware is 
typically installed when a user clicks on a malicious link, opens a file in an 
e-mail that installs the malware, or through drive-by downloads (which 
does not require user-installation) from a compromised Web site.87 
 
The FBI further states that, “hospitals, school districts, state and local 
governments, law enforcement agencies, small businesses, large businesses ̶ these are just 
 
82 See Stacy Cowley & Nicole Perlroth, One Gap in Bank’s Armor, and a Hacker Slips In, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2019 at A1; Nicole Hong, Liz Hoffman & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Capital One 
Breach Affects 106 Million Card Applicants, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2019 at A1. 
83 See Gunjan Banerji, Capital One Shares Sink After Breach Is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., July 31, 
2019 at B12. 
84 See Robert McMillan, Accused Hacker Exploited Vulnerability in Cloud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 
2019 at A1; See also Dana Mattioli, Robert McMillan & Sebastian Herrera, Hacking Suspect Left 
Trail of Clues Online, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2019 at A1. 
85 Id. 
86 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 13. 
87 See Ransomware Victims Urged to Report Infections to Federal Law Enforcement, FBI Public 
Service Announcement, Alert No. I-091516-PSA, https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160915.aspx.  
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some of the entities impacted by ransomware, an insidious type of malware that encrypts, 
or locks, valuable digital files and demands a ransom to release them.”88 The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) warns, “Ransomware not only targets home users; 
businesses can also become infected with ransomware, leading to negative consequences, 
including: temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information, disruption 
to regular operations, financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and potential 
harm to an organization’s reputation.”89 Consider that, “the inability to access the 
important data these kinds of organizations keep can be catastrophic in terms of the loss 
of sensitive or proprietary information, the disruption to regular operations, financial 
losses incurred to restore systems and files, and the potential harm to an organization’s 
reputation.”90 The FBI warns, “in a ransomware attack, victims ̶ upon seeing an e-mail 
addressed to them ̶ will open it and may click on an attachment that appears legitimate, 
like an invoice or an electronic fax, but which actually contains the malicious 
ransomware code.”91 Alternatively, “the e-mail might contain a legitimate-looking URL, 
but when a victim clicks on it, they are directed to a website that infects their computer 
with malicious software.”92 In addition: 
Once the infection is present, the malware begins encrypting files and 
folders on local drives, any attached drives, backup drives, and potentially 
other computers on the same network that the victim computer is attached 
to. Users and organizations are generally not aware they have been 
 
88 See Cyber Crime: Key Priorities, Ransomware, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last 
viewed Aug. 24, 2018).  
89 See NCCIC Alert (TA17-132A), Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware (June 7, 
2018), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A. 
90 See Cyber Crime: Key Priorities, Ransomware, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last 
viewed Aug. 24, 2018). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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infected until they can no longer access their data or until they begin to see 
computer messages advising them of the attack and demands for a ransom 
payment in exchange for a decryption key. These messages include 
instructions on how to pay the ransom, usually with bitcoins because of 
the anonymity this virtual currency provides.93 
 
Malicious and costly ransomware attacks continue daily, including and resulting 
in substantial disruption to the citizens of Atlanta,94 Baltimore,95 and many others.96 New 
ransomware exploits are found constantly. For example, on January 22, 2020, security 
expert Ravi Gidwani reports, “a nasty and one-of-its-kind ransomware… one that uses 
Note.js framework, which enables it to infect Windows based OS.”97 This is significant 
because:  
Node.js is an open-source, cross-platform, JavaScript run-time 
environment that executes JavaScript code outside of a browser. It is built 
on the V8 JavaScript engine… Google’s open source high- performance 
JavaScript and WebAssembly engine, written in C++. It is used in Chrome 
and in Node.js, among others. It implements ECMAScript and 
WebAssembly, and runs on Windows 7 or later, macOS 10.12+, and 
Linux systems that use x64, IA-32, ARM, or MIPS processors. V8 can run 
standalone, or can be embedded into any C++ application. Interestingly, 
users can easily get infected by this Nodera ransomware while browsing 
online, either by clicking on a malicious HTA file or when served as a 
malvertisement.98 
 
 Software engineer Tim Trautman believes this may be significant because, as a 
JavaScript framework, “Node has a very large community around it. Ransomware 
 
93 Id. 
94 See Press Release, Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta 
Ransomware Attack (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/atlanta-us-attorney-
charges-iranian-nationals-city-atlanta-ransomware-attack. 
95 See Niraj Chokshi, Hackers Are Holding Baltimore Hostage: How They Struck and What’s 
Next, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/baltimore-
ransomware.html. 
96 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 38. 
97 See Ravi Gidwani, First Note.js-based Ransomware: Nodera, Quickheal.com (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20200122181519/https://blogs.quickheal.com/first-node-js-based-
ransomware-nodera/.  
98 Id. 
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running on Node could increase the prevalence of Ransomware attacks by lowering the 
technical barrier of entry to a much larger / less technically-savy pool of software 
engineers.”99 
V. MIRAI BOTNET 
Akamai reports starting to track a strain of malware during June 2016 that targets 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices and home Internet routers.100  Soon thereafter, this 
malware, under the name of Mirai, spread worldwide.101 Journalist Elie Bursztein 
considers the Mirai attack particularly remarkable because “they were carried out via 
small, innocuous Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices like home routers, air-quality monitors, 
and personal surveillance cameras. At its peak, Mirai infected over 600,000 vulnerable 
IoT devices.”102 Journalist Bursztein explains, “At its core, Mirai is a self-propagating 
worm… a malicious program that replicates itself by finding, attacking and infecting 
vulnerable IoT devices.”103 
The replication module is responsible for growing the botnet size by 
enslaving as many vulnerable IoT devices as possible. It accomplishes this 
by (randomly) scanning the entire Internet for viable targets and attacking. 
Once it compromises a vulnerable device, the module reports it to the 
C&C servers so it can be infected with the latest Mirai payload, as the 
diagram above illustrates. 
To compromise devices, the initial version of Mirai relied 
exclusively on a fixed set of 64 well-known default login/password 
 
99 Email from Tim Trautman to Lawrence J. Trautman, 15:03 CST, Jan. 22, 2020 (on file with 
authors). 
100 See Akamai’s [State of the Internet] / Security, Q3 2016 Report, 6 Akami Technologies, Inc. 
(2016), https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q3-2016-state-
of-the-internet-security-report.pdf. 
101 Id. 
102 See Elie Bursztein, Inside the Infamous Mirai IoT Botnet: A Retrospective Analysis, Cloudflare 
Blog (Dec. 14, 2017), https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-the-infamous-iot-botnet-a-
retrospective-analysis/.  
103 Id. 
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combinations commonly used by IoT devices. While this attack was very 
low tech, it proved extremely effective…104 
 
Akamai observes that use of IoT devices and other capabilities usually not found 
in botnets make Mirai “truly exceptional… specifically Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) based attacks, varying levels of attack traffic customization, and telnet scanning.  
In addition, it generates its attacks directly…. Due to the public release of the source 
code… we’re likely to see new, more-capable variants of Mirai in the near future.”105  In 
addition, 
Mirai is a botnet that would not exist if more networks practiced basic 
hygiene, such as blocking insecure protocols by default. This is not new—
we’ve seen similar network hygiene issues as the source of infection in the 
Brobot attacks of 2011 and 2012. The botnet spreads like a worm, using 
telnet and more than 60 default username and password combinations to 
scan the Internet for additional systems to infect. The majority of these 
systems appear to be Digital Video Recorders (DVRs), ip-enabled 
surveillance cameras, and consumer routers. Once a system is infected, it 
connects to the command and control (C2) structure of the botnet, then 
continues scanning for other vulnerable systems while waiting for attack 
commands.106 
 
 During May 2018, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security 
jointly published, A Report to the President on Enhancing the Resilience of the Internet 
and Communications Ecosystem Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed 
Threats.107 This publication was the result of consultations with interested agencies, 
including: “the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the sector-specific agencies, the Federal Communications Commission and 
 
104 Id. 
105 See Akamai, supra note 100 at 15. 
106 Id. 
107 A Report to the President on Enhancing the Resilience of the Internet and Communications 
Ecosystem Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Threats, U.S. Departments of 
Commerce and Homeland Security (May 22, 2018). 
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Federal Trade Commission.”108 As a result of the rapid growth in the IoT devices, the 
Report notes that distributed denial of service “DDoS attacks have grown in size to more 
than one terabit per second, far outstripping expected size and excess capacity. As a 
result, recovery time from these types of attacks may be too slow, particularly when 
mission-critical services are involved.”109 These automated and distributed attacks (e.g., 
botnets), “are used for a variety of malicious activities… that overwhelm networked 
resources, sending massive quantities of spam, disseminating keylogger and other 
malware, ransomware attacks distributed by botnets that hold systems and data 
hostage.”110 The Report further states, “Traditional DDoS mitigation techniques, such as 
network providers building in excess capacity to absorb the effects of botnets, are 
designed to protect against botnets of an anticipated size… [but] were not designed to 
remedy other classes of malicious activities facilitated by botnets, such as ransomware or 
computational propaganda.”111 And: 
The DDoS attacks launched from the Mirai botnet in the fall of 2016, for 
example, reached a level of sustained traffic that overwhelmed many 
common DDoS mitigation tools and services, and even disrupted a 
Domain Name System (DNS) service that was a commonly used 
component in many DDoS mitigation strategies. This attack also 
highlighted the growing insecurities in—and threats from— consumer-
grade IoT devices. As a new technology, IoT devices are often built and 
deployed without important security features and practices in place. While 
the original Mirai variant was relatively simple, exploiting weak device 
passwords, more sophisticated botnets have followed; for example, the 
Reaper botnet uses known code vulnerabilities to exploit a long list of 
devices, and one of the largest DDoS attacks seen to date recently 
exploited a newly discovered vulnerability in the relatively obscure 
MemCacheD software. These examples clearly demonstrate the risks 
 
108 Id. at 3. 
109 Id. at 5. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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posed by botnets of this size and scope, as well as the expected innovation 
and increased scale and complexity of future attacks.112 
 
In December 2016, investigative cyber reporter, Brian Krebs released a story noting that: 
New research published this week could provide plenty of fresh fodder for 
Mirai, a malware strain that enslaves poorly-secured Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices for use in powerful online attacks. Researchers in Austria 
have unearthed a pair of backdoor accounts in more than 80 different IP 
camera models made by Sony Corp. Separately, Israeli security experts 
have discovered trivially exploitable weaknesses in nearly a half-million 
white-labeled IP camera models that are not currently sought out by 
Mirai.113 
 
VI. IoT THREAT VECTORS DURING TIMES OF CRISIS 
Governance challenges during times of crisis has been the focus of considerable 
scholarship during recent years.114 Before addressing IoT vulnerabilities in times of 
crisis, it is important to provide a working definition of  IoT system vulnerability, and a 
brief discussion on the crisis context.  
IoT System Vulnerability 
As discussed earlier (in section II), IoT is a vast network of devices that are 
connected to the internet.  These devices interact with each other over wireless 
connections to create, exchange and transfer data without human interaction. Abomhara  
defines IoT vulnerabilities as weaknesses in an IoT system or its design that allow an 
intruder to execute commands, access unauthorized data, and/or conduct denial-of-
service attacks.115 Vulnerabilities can be flaws in the IoT hardware or software, 
 
112 Id. at 6. 
113 https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/12/researchers-find-fresh-fodder-for-iot-attack-cannons/ 
114  See Trautman, Crisis Governance, supra note 54. 
115 See Mohamed Abomhara & Geir M. Køien, Cyber Security and the Internet of Things: 
Vulnerabilities, Threats, Intruders and Attacks, 4(1) J. CYBER SEC. & MOBILITY, 65 (2015). 
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weaknesses in policies and procedures used in the IoT systems or misuse of the IoT 
systems by the users themselves.116 
Crisis Context 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a disaster as any unforeseen 
event that causes damage, destruction, ecological disruption, loss of human life, human 
suffering, deterioration of health and health services on a scale that requires response 
efforts extending beyond the affected community.117 Every year natural disasters cause 
significant economic losses and social impacts. With the ever-increasing population and 
infrastructures, the world’s exposure to disaster related hazards is growing.  Disaster 
contexts are volatile and often result in non-routine actions.118 In time of disasters, 
knowledge availability varies extremely as compared to normal situations and people 
sometimes have to improvise to accommodate the condition critical for responding to the 
crisis. At times, disaster managers have to make decisions based on little or no 
information.  The main characteristics of disasters are unpredictability, availability of 
limited resources in impacted areas, and dynamic changes in the environment.119  During 
disasters, the impacts on people and infrastructures cannot be accurately predicted. 
Disaster management involves creating plans through which people can alleviate 
vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.  In managing a disaster, stakeholders 
 
116 Id. 
117 See Community emergency preparedness: a manual for managers and policy-makers, World 
Health Organization (WHO) (1999), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241545194.pdf 
(accessed June 25, 2017). 
118 See Jeannette Sutton, Leysia Palen & Irina Shklovski, Backchannels on the Front Lines: 
Emergent Uses of Social Media in the 2007 Southern California Wildfires, Proceedings of the 5th 
International ISCRAM Conference, Washington, DC, USA. (2008). 
119 See ManzhuYu, Chaowei Yang, & Yun Li, Big Data in Natural Disaster Management: A 
Review, 8(5), GEOSCIENCES, 165 (2018). 
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collocated or geographically distributed are required to collaborate in order to provide 
effective and efficient disaster relief.  Information and communication technologies play 
crucial roles in every step of the disaster management lifecycle (preparedness, response, 
recovery, mitigation).120  With recent technological advances, IoT has the potential to 
become one of the most important enabling technologies for disaster management and 
relief.121 Sinha et al. identifies the following three major application areas of IoT in 
disaster management (i) disaster risk minimization and prevention - monitoring disaster 
events with satellite communication, designing early warning systems, using social media 
for situational awareness; (ii) disaster response - real-time communication for effective 
and timely relief operations; and (iii) disaster recovery - online search for missing person 
and fund management systems. IoT can also be used to plan preventive maintenance and 
repairs; evaluate whether structures can withstand a coming weather event while 
continuing normal operations and close unsafe assets.122 The dynamic nature of a disaster 
context stresses upon the ability to make efficient and precise decisions in minimal time. 
 
120 See Louis Ngamassi, Thiagarajan Ramakrishnan & Shasedur Rahman,Use of Social Media for 
Disaster Management: A Prescriptive Framework, 28(3) J. ORGANIZATIONAL & END USER 
COMPUTING (JOEUC) (2016); Louis Ngamassi, Thiagarajan Ramakrishnan & Shasedur Rahman, 
Examining the Role of Social Media in Disaster Management from an Attribution Theory 
Perspective. Proceedings of the 13th   International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis 
Response and Management (ISCRAM), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil May 22-25, (2016); Louis 
Ngamassi, A. Malik & D. Ebert, Social Media Visual Analytic Toolkits for Disaster Management: 
A Review of the Literature.   International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis 
Response and Management (ISCRAM), Albi, France May 21-24, (2017). 
121 See A. Sinha, Kumar, P., Rana, N. P., Islam, R., & Dwivedi, Y. K. Impact of internet of things 
(IoT) in disaster management: a task-technology fit perspective, 283(1-2) ANNALS OF OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH,  759-794 (2019). 
122 See A. Sinha, Kumar, P., Rana, N. P., Islam, R., & Dwivedi, Y. K. Impact of internet of things 
(IoT) in disaster management: a task-technology fit perspective, 283(1-2) ANNALS OF OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH,  759-794 (2019). 
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The IoT technology, having the potential for communicating instantaneous information 
updates, can be a key player for realizing dynamic workflow adaptations.123 
IoT Vulnerability in Time of Crisis 
While IoT has enormous potential for disaster management, it also comes with a 
number of challenges during time of crisis. Large scale natural disasters such as the South 
Asian Tsunami in 2004, the Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Haiti earthquake in 2010, and 
the Hurricane Harvey in 2017 led to massive destruction of information and 
communication technology infrastructures and highlighted the vulnerabilities of IoT 
systems.124 In time of crisis, some of the major IoT system vulnerabilities are related to 
system interoperability and system interconnectivity two important concepts in IoT 
paradigm. 
IoT systems rely on the interoperability of the different objects that are 
interconnected. IoT objects interact smartly through the Internet with other devices. In 
time of crisis, some of these devices may likely got destroyed which may significantly 
hamper the effective functioning of the IoT system.  Therefore, the more objects get 
connected through IoT system, the greater becomes the possibility of mayhem in times of 
crises. Moreover, IoT services such as process automation, device management, decision 
making, are usually hosted on cloud to allow users to access IoT devices anytime, 
anywhere. If the Internet infrastructure is destroyed during a disaster, IoT services will 
not be available to the users. Technological advances such as “Content-Centric 
 
123 Id. 
124 See Trautman, Crisis Governance, supra note 54. 
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Networking (CCN) has become a promising network paradigm that satisfies the 
requirements of fast packets delivery for emergency applications of IoT.”125 
 
VII. MANUFACTURED USAGE DESCRIPTION (MUD) METHODOLOGY 
NIST observes, “Unfortunately, IoT devices often lack efficient and effective 
features for customers to use to help mitigate cybersecurity risks.”126 The NIST internal 
report 8259 warns: 
Consequently, some IoT devices are less easily secured using customers’ 
existing methods because the cybersecurity features they expect may not 
be available on IoT devices or may function differently than is expected 
based on conventional IT devices. This means IoT device customers may 
have to select, implement, and manage additional or new cybersecurity 
controls or alter the controls they already have. However, new or tailored 
controls to sufficiently mitigate risks to the same level as before may not 
be available to all customers or implementable with all IoT devices. 
Compounding this problem, customers may not know they need to alter 
their existing IT processes to accommodate IoT. The result is many IoT 
devices are not secured properly, so attackers can more easily compromise 
them and use them to harm device customers and conduct additional 
nefarious acts (e.g., distributed denial of service [DDoS] attacks) against 
other organizations.127 
 
As the lack of standardization across the IoT market has led to a series of cyber-
attacks and interoperability issues, the Manufactured Usage Description (MUD) has been 
developed as the industry’s initial solution.128 The international standards body, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), moved the draft MUD standard into a quasi-accepted 
 
125 See Fawaz Alassery, Fast Packet Delivery Techniques for Urgent Packets in Emergency 
Applications of Internet of Things, 11(3) INT’L J. COMP. NETWORKS & COMMUNICATIONS (May 
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405251.    
126 See Fagan, et al., supra note 4 at vii. 
127 Id. 
128 Ryan McCauley, The Internet of Things Needs Standardization ̶ Here’s Why, govtech.com 
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.govtech.com/fs/The-Internet-of-Things-Needs-Standardization-
Heres-Why.html.  
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proposed standard RFC 8520 in March 2019.129 In response to the release to RFC 8520, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a draft of NIST 
Special Publication (NIST SP) 1800-15: Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of 
Things (IoT) Devices – Mitigating Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage 
Description (MUD).130 NIST is the standards body – particularly for cybersecurity 
standards – for the US Government.131 The document describes MUD and its purpose:  
The goal of the Internet Engineering Task Force’s manufacturer usage 
description (MUD) architecture is for Internet of Things (IoT) devices to 
behave as intended by the manufacturers of the devices. This is done by 
providing a standard way for manufacturers to identify each device’s type 
and to indicate the network communications that it requires to perform its 
intended function. When MUD is used, the network will automatically 
permit the IoT device to perform as intended, and the network will 
prohibit all other device behaviors.132  
 
MUD-capable IoT devices for use in homes and small businesses make it more 
difficult for malicious actors to exploit these IoT devices to mount DDoS attacks across 
the Internet.133 NIST explains that “MUD provides a standard method for access control 
information to be available to network control devices.”134 Distributed Denial of Service 
 
129 Manufacturer Usage Description Specification, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
RFC8520 (Mar. 2019), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8520. 
130 Donna Dodson, Tim Polk, Murugiah Souppaya, William C. Barker, Parisa Grayeli & Susan 
Symington, Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating 
Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), NIST Special Pub. 1800-
15A (Prelim. Draft Nov. 2019), https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/1800-15/draft.  
131 Public Law 113–283. ‘Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014’ 
132 Donna Dodson, Tim Polk, Murugiah Souppaya, Yemi Fashina, Parisa Grayeli, Joshua 
Klosterman, Blaine Mulugeta, Mary Raguso, Susan Symington, Jaideep Singh, William C. Barker, 
Dean Coclin, Clint Wilson,  Darshak Thakore, Mark Walker, Eliot Lear, Brian Weis, Tim Jones & 
Drew Cohen, Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating 
Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), NIST Special Pub. 1800-
15 (Prelim. Draft Apr. 2019),  
https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/sp1800/iot-ddos-nist-sp1800-15-preliminary-
draft.pdf.  
133 See Manufacturer Usage Description Specification, supra note 129. 
134 Donna Dodson, Tim Polk, Murugiah Souppaya, William C. Barker, Parisa Grayeli & Susan 
Symington, Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating 
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(DDoS) attacks are thwarted “by prohibiting unauthorized traffic to and from IoT 
devices. Even if an IoT device becomes compromised, MUD prevents it from being used 
in any attack that would require the device to send traffic to an unauthorized 
destination.”135 Exhibit 6 provides a schematic of this security methodology. 
Exhibit 6 136 
Manufactured Usage Development (MUD) Methodology 
 
 
Description 
A more detailed depiction of MUD is found in IETF’s Manufacturer Usage 
Description Specification provides a description of what MUD fundamentally consists of: 
“three architectural building blocks: A URL that can be used to locate a description; The 
description itself, including how it is interpreted; and A means for local network 
management systems to retrieve the description.137 
 
Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), NIST Special Pub. 1800-
15A 1 (Prelim. Draft Nov. 2019), https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/1800-15/draft. 
135 Id. 
136 See NIST Draft 1800-15, supra note 130. 
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Design 
The MUD intends to achieve several goals including: 
 
• Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device to those 
communications intended by the manufacturer; 
• Provide a means to scale network policies to the ever-increasing number 
of types of devices in the network; 
• Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way that is 
faster than the time it might take to update systems. This will be 
particularly true for systems that are no longer supported; 
• Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare minimum; 
and 
• Provide a means of extensibility for manufacturers to express other device 
capabilities or requirements.138 
 
These goals make the use of this framework practical while accomplishing a 
standardized level of security and use. However, the MUD design is not intended to: 
• address network authorization of general purpose computers, as 
their manufacturers cannot envision a specific communication 
pattern to describe;   
• In addition, even those devices that have a single or small number 
of uses might have very broad communication patterns.  MUD on 
its own is not for them either; 
• Although MUD can provide network administrators with some 
additional protection when device vulnerabilities exist, it will 
never replace the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities; 
• Finally, no matter what the manufacturer specifies in a MUD file, 
these are not directives, but suggestions.  How they are instantiated 
locally will depend on many factors and will be ultimately up to 
the local network administrator, who must decide what is 
appropriate in a given circumstances.139 
 
 
137 See Manufacturer Usage Description Specification, supra note 129. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
EARLY DRAFT-COMMENTS WELCOME-1/27/2020 9:12 PM 
 
©   2019-20 Lawrence J. Trautman, Page 42 All rights reserved 
Mohammed T. Hussein, Louis Ngamassi 
& Mason J. Molesky 
The Promise of Blockchain 
 In just about a decade blockchain technology has grown to be viewed with 
substantial promise for its potential  to provide enhanced software security.140 Just a few 
of the other promising applications include: smart contracts;141 virtual currencies;142 and 
numerous financial services functions, including execution and clearing.143 Writing in 
2018, Jianli Pan et al., observe: 
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) is facing significant scalability and 
security challenges. On the one hand, IoT devices are ‘weak’ and need 
external assistance. Edge computing provides a promising direction 
addressing the deficiency of centralized cloud computing in scaling 
massive number of devices.  On the other hand, IoT devices are also 
relatively ’vulnerable’ facing malicious hackers due to resource 
constraints. The emerging blockchain and smart contracts technologies 
bring a series of new  security features for IoT and edge computing.144 
 
 In an attempt to provide solutions to these issues, an edge-IoT framework named 
‘EdgeChain’ is designed and prototyped by Jianli Pan et al., “based on blockchain and 
smart contracts. The core idea is to integrate a permissioned blockchain and the internal 
currency or ‘coin’ system to link the edge cloud resource pool with each IoT device’ 
account and resource usage, and hence behavior of the IoT devices.”145 Consider: 
EdgeChain uses a credit-based resource management system to control 
how much resource IoT devices can obtain from edge servers, based on 
 
140 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88(2) UMKC L. 
REV. 239 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324660.  
141 Id. 
142 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What 
Gives? 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730983; Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. 
Gox?, 20 RICHMOND J. L. & TECH. 13 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393537.  
143 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial 
Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2786186.  
144 See Jianli Pan, Jianyu Wang, Austin Hester, Ismail Alqerm, Yuanni Liu & Ying Zhao, 
EdgeChain: An Edge-IoT Framework and Prototype Based on Blockchain and Smart Contracts, 
arXiv:1806.06185v1 (June 16, 2018). 
145 Id. 
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pre-defined rules on priority, application types and past behaviors. Smart 
contracts are used to enforce the rules and policies to regulate the IoT 
device behavior in a non-deniable and automated manner. All the IoT 
activities and transactions  are recorded into blockchain for secure data 
logging and auditing. [Jianli Pan et al.] implement an EdgeChain 
prototype and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the ideas. The 
results show that while gaining the security benefits of blockchain and 
smart contracts, the cost of integrating them into EdgeChain is within a 
reasonable and acceptable range.146 
 
 The Jianli Pan et al. design schematic is constructed “Specifically, … [to] 
partially reference the Manufacturers Usage Description (MUD) files which list the 
activities and communications allowed for IoT devices. Such specifications contain 
input/output data type, requests of edge resources, MAC address, IP address, network 
port, communications protocol, and indication flags… each device registers a unique 
account address…”147 Here’s how it works: “Upon registration, the edge server will 
verify the [specified] information and take control of the modification rights of 
registration data. More parameters will be appended such as priority, coin balance, credit, 
and requests timestamp to benefit device management.”148  Pan et al. include several 
other attributes they defined in their registration database, “all the devices key 
information, value units, and examples, including: … account address; network port; 
input/output data; bandwidth request; CPU request; memory request; storage request; 
MAC address; priority*; coin balance*; credit*; isBlocked*; isRegistered*; [and] last 
request id*.”149 By way of explanation, Pan et al. observe, “Edge servers and IoT devices 
have different authorities to modify the registry. The attributes marked with an ‘*’ can 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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only be updated by the edge server. The other basic attributes are filled up during the first 
registration process initialized by IoT devices.”150 
Importance of Consumer Education 
 Any engineering professor will tell you that human behavior and attitudes will 
play a determinative role in the success of any product design. NIST advises: 
Addressing the challenges of IoT cybersecurity necessitates educating IoT 
device customers on the differences in cybersecurity risks and risk 
mitigation for IoT versus conventional IT, as NIST has documented in 
Internal Report (IR) 8228, Considerations for Managing Internet of Things 
(IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks.  The challenges also necessitate 
educating IoT device manufacturers on how to identify the cybersecurity 
features customers need IoT devices to have. This includes improving 
communications between manufacturers and customers regarding device 
cybersecurity features and related expectations.151 
 
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
NIST 
The NIST continues to provide valuable research efforts, publications, and 
interface between governmental resources and industry. Professor Václav Janecek writes 
about the treasure trove of collected and created personal data from IoT devices, “whose 
management poses serious ethical and legal questions. Ownership of personal data 
underpins the issues revolving around data management and control, such as privacy, 
trust, and security, and it has also important implications for the future of the ‘digital’ 
economy and trade in data.”152  
 
150 Id. 
151 See Fagan, et al., supra note 4 at vii. 
152 See Václav Janecek, Ownership of Personal Data in the Internet of Things, 34(5) COMP. L. & 
SEC. REV. 1039 (2018). 
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During January 2020, NIST released version 1.0 of its Privacy Framework.153 
This new tool for managing privacy risk contains “an overarching structure modeled on 
that of the widely used NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the two frameworks are 
designed to be complementary and also updated over time.”154 NIST observes that 
privacy interests, “includes information about specific individuals, such as their addresses 
or Social Security numbers, that a company might gather and use in the normal course of 
business… [requiring] an organization… take action to ensure [these data] are not 
misused in a way that could embarrass, endanger or compromise the customers.”155 
While not a regulation or law, the Privacy Framework is “a voluntary tool that can help 
organizations manage privacy risk arising from their products and services, as well as 
demonstrate compliance with laws that may affect them.”156 Other recent NIST 
publications addressing IoT issues are available.157 
 As we approach the end of our discussion about cybersecurity and privacy risks, it 
is important to consider that data security “for an IoT device can [not] all be addressed 
within the devise itself. Every IoT device operates within a broader IoT environment 
where it interacts with other IoT and non-IoT devices, cloud-based services, people, and 
other components.”158 
 
153 See NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool For Improving Privacy Through Enterprise Risk 
Management, Version 1.0, NIST (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2020/01/16/NIST%20Privacy%20Framework_V1.0.
pdf. 
154 See Press Release, NIST Releases Version 1.0 of Privacy Framework, NIST, U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2020/01/nist-releases-version-
10-privacy-framework.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See Fagan, et al., supra note 4;  
158 See Boeckl et al., supra note 27 at 1.  
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California Law SB. 327 
A new Californian law, starting in 2020, will require manufactures to implement 
“reasonable security feature[s]” on their connected devices or IoT.159 This is one of the 
first regulations in the US to place information security requirements on all consumer 
products/devices and to place this burden on the manufacturers.  
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After considering a multitude of possible steps that can be taken, we have 
concluded that the goals and actions contained in the mid-2018, A Report to the President 
on Enhancing the Resilience of the Internet and Communications Ecosystem Against 
Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Threats160 is a good place to start. In relevant 
part, the Report states: 
These goals and actions aim to present a portfolio of mutually supportive 
actions that, if implemented, would dramatically improve the resilience of 
the ecosystem. The recommended actions include ongoing activities that 
should be continued or expanded, as well as new initiatives. No single 
investment or activity can mitigate all threats, but organized discussions 
and stakeholder feedback will allow us to further evaluate and prioritize 
these activities based on their expected return on investment and ability to 
measurably impact ecosystem resilience. We look to stakeholders across 
the ecosystem to work with government to implement the proposed 
activities, realize opportunities for support and leadership, and remove 
impediments to implementation.161  
 
Accordingly, for consideration by our readers, we include the Report’s list of 
goals and actions: 
Goal 1: Identify a clear pathway toward an adaptable, sustainable, 
and secure technology marketplace.  
 
159 Title 1.81.26 (commencing with Section 1798.91.04) to Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code - 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327  
160 See Report to the President, supra note 107 at 25. 
161 Id.  
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Action 1.1 Using industry-led inclusive processes, establish internationally 
applicable IoT capability baselines supporting lifecycle security for home 
and industrial applications founded on voluntary, industry-driven 
international standards.  
 Action 1.2 The federal government should leverage industry-developed 
capability baselines, where appropriate, in establishing capability 
baselines for IoT devices in U.S. government environments to meet 
federal security requirements, promote adoption of industry-led baselines, 
and accelerate international standardization.  
Action 1.3 Software development tools and processes to significantly 
reduce the incidence of security vulnerabilities in commercial-off-the-
shelf software must be more widely adopted by industry. The federal 
government should collaborate with industry to encourage further 
enhancement and application of these practices and to improve 
marketplace adoption and accountability.  
 Action 1.4 Industry should expedite the development and deployment of 
innovative technologies for prevention and mitigation of distributed 
threats. Accordingly, where relevant, government should prioritize the 
application of research and development funds and technology transition 
efforts to support advancements in DDoS prevention and mitigation, as 
well as foundational technologies to prevent botnet creation. Where 
appropriate, civil society should amplify those efforts.  
Action 1.5 Government, industry, and civil society should collaborate to 
ensure that existing best practices, frameworks, and guidelines relevant to 
IoT, as well as procedures to ensure transparency, are more widely 
adopted across the digital ecosystem. Emerging risks in the IoT space 
must be addressed in an open and inclusive fashion.  
Goal 2: Promote innovation in the infrastructure for dynamic 
adaptation to evolving threats.  
Action 2.1 Internet service providers and their peering partners76 should 
expand current information sharing to achieve more timely and effective 
sharing of actionable threat information both domestically and globally.  
Action 2.2 Stakeholders and subject matter experts, in consultation with 
NIST, should lead the development of a CSF Profile for Enterprise DDoS 
Prevention and Mitigation.  
Action 2.3 The federal government should lead by example and 
demonstrate practicality of technologies, creating market incentives for 
early adopters.  
Action 2.4 Industry, government, and civil society should collaborate with 
the full range of stakeholders to continue to enhance and standardize 
information-sharing protocols.  
Action 2.5 The federal government should work with U.S. and global 
infrastructure providers to expand best practices on network traffic 
management across the ecosystem.  
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Goal 3: Promote innovation at the edge of the network to prevent, 
detect, and mitigate automated, distributed attacks.  
Action 3.1 The networking industry should expand current product 
development and standardization efforts for effective and secure traffic 
management in home and enterprise environments.   
Action 3.2 Home IT and IoT products should be easy to understand and 
simple to use securely.  
Action 3.3 Enterprises should migrate to network architectures that 
facilitate detection, disruption, and mitigation of automated, distributed 
threats. They should also consider how their own networks put others at 
risk.  
Action 3.4 The federal government should investigate how wider IPv6 
deployment can alter the economics of both attack and defense.  
Goal 4: Promote and support coalitions between the security, 
infrastructure, and operational technology communities domestically 
and around the world.  
Action 4.1 ISPs and large enterprises should increase information sharing 
with government agencies and with one another to provide more timely 
and actionable information regarding automated, distributed threats.  
Action 4.2 The federal government should promote international adoption 
of best practices and relevant tools through bilateral and multilateral 
international engagement.  
Action 4.3 Sector-specific regulatory agencies, where relevant, should 
work with industry to ensure nondeceptive marketing and foster 
appropriate sector-specific security considerations.  
Action 4.4 The community should identify leverage points and take 
concrete steps to disrupt attacker tools and incentives, including the active 
sharing and use of reputation data.  
Action 4.5 The cybersecurity community should continue to engage with 
the operational technology community to promote awareness and 
accelerate incorporation of cybersecurity technologies.  
Goal 5: Increase awareness and education across the ecosystem.  
Action 5.1 The private sector should establish and administer voluntary 
informational tools for home IoT devices, supported by a scalable and 
cost-effective assessment process, that consumers can trust and intuitively 
understand.  
Action 5.2 The private sector should establish voluntary labeling schemes 
for industrial IoT applications, supported by a scalable and cost-effective 
assessment process, to offer sufficient assurance for critical infrastructure 
applications of IoT.  
Action 5.3 Government should encourage the academic and training 
sectors to fully integrate secure coding practices into computer science and 
related programs.  
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Action 5.4 The academic sector, in collaboration with the National 
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, should establish cybersecurity as a 
fundamental requirement across all engineering disciplines.  
Action 5.5 The federal government should establish a public awareness 
campaign to support recognition and adoption of the home IoT device 
security baseline and branding.162 
 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
Costly data breaches continue at an alarming rate. The challenge facing humans 
as they attempt to govern the process of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and the 
impact of billions of sensory devices connected to the Internet is a challenge to all 
involved. We believe this Article contributes to our understanding of the widespread 
exposure to malware associated with the Internet of Things (IoT) and adds to the nascent 
but emerging literature on governance of enterprise risk, a subject of vital societal 
importance. 
 
162 Id. 
